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The purpose of this ATM is to review and status the BxA effort with respect 
to the Apollo 15 Anomalies Investigation. 
The results of analyses and COp:Jpleted tests are summarized and the plans 
for additional testing, etc. are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Apollo 15 Anomalies that were investigated were as follows: 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
UHT/Subpackage #2 Interface 
Shorting Switch Activation 
UHT/SIDE Interface 
HFE Boyd Bolts 
SIDE Connector 
Rear Curtain Cover Lanyard 
Several methods of evaluation were used to analyze the crew deployment anomalies 
as reported in the post Apollo #15 debriefings at NASA/MSC. They were, 
a. The Techaical Air -to-Ground Transcription. 
b. Crew debriefing comments. 
c. Lunar surface photograpPs. 
d. Repeated tests with the E-2A-2 ALSEP Training Unit. 
e. Apollo Lunar Surface P}"ocedures. 
f. Int•l"views with NASA/MSC Crew Procedures Division personnel and the 
L:M.P (J. Irwin). 
j. Review of BxA CF2 procedures. 
h, Review of BxA Crew Engineering Test results for the A-2 Flight System. 
In forming the conclusions and recommendations, the existing documentation and 
test results were reviewed, new tests were performed where required, and 
recommendations were made for design changes as indicated for each anomaly. 
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l. 
a. 
UHT/Subpackage #2 Interface. 
Apollo 15 Final Lunar Surface Procedures 
"l.MP Activities 
Pull tool stowage pip pins (4) 
Unstow UHT 1 s 
EVA Time 
3 hr, 59 min 
3 hr, 59 min'' 
b. Apollo 15 Technical Air-to-Ground Voice Transcription 
11 Day Hr Min 
05 04 12 
05 04 12 
05 04 12 
05 04 12 
05 04 13 
05 04 13 
Sec 
22 
23 
24 
26 
16 
28 
LMP-EVA 
CDR-EVA 
LMP-EVA 
CDR-EVA 
CDR-EVA 
LMP-EVA 
Youre hung up. 
Yes, sure am. 
Pull that pin there. 
Pulled it. Okay. 
Okay, give me one of those-if you can 
get them apart. 
>~>!<>'.< seen them wedged in there like that 
before. 
33 
05 >:o:<>:-1ot of surprises; got to expect surprises. 04 13 31 CDR-EVA 
Here, maybe if I hold the fitting-rotate it. 
05 Can't. 04 13 51 LMP-EVA 
05 I've never seen it wedged in there like that 04 13 52 CDR-EVA 
either. There, whew, I got one. 
05 You got one? 04 14 01 LMP-EVA 
05 Okay ... 04 14 03 CDR-EVA 
04 14 19 LMP-EVA 05 Straps do come handy for something, huh? 
04 14 21 CDR-EVA OS Looks like it might work. Okay. 
04 14 32 LMP-EVA 05 Got it. 11 
c. Apollo 15 ALSEP A-2 Astronaut Debriefing 
"(Q) The UHT removal problem-were the UHT's stuck together or both 
stuck to the bracket? 
(A) They were hung up in the front bracket. Both tools were removed 
along with the bracket. (Jim Irwin- LMP). " 
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d. Analysis and Completed Tests 
Figures #1 and #2 depict the front and side views, respectively, of the 
stowed UHT/Subpackage #2 interface. The four pull pins located at or near 
this interface are ennwnerated as follows: 
Pin# 1 secures the subpallet to Subpackage #2 
Pin #2 secures the front tool bracket to Subpackage #2 
Pin #3 secures the UHT' s to the front tool bracket 
Pin #4 secures the DR T (Dome Removal Tool) to the front tool bracket. 
The deploym.ent sequence specifies that the LMP should remove the four 
pull pins (no particular sequence is specified), unstow the UHT's, (remove 
the front tool bracket, although this step is not specifically called out), and 
then unstow the carry bar sections, the DRT and FTT (Fuel Transfer Tool) 
in sequence. 
Tll.e voice transcript indicates that the CDR was performing these tasks 
a.ncl not the LMP and that the LMP had to verbally and physically assist the 
CDlt in unstowixig the UHT's. Since the amount of cross-training between the 
. C • .$;,,~.0 ,LMP is somewhat limited, it is possible that part of the problem 
._y, ~'·-l'butable to the CDR 1 s lack of sufficient familiarity with this task . 
and apr:!£;dv!al error may have been a contribuLng factor to the problem. · 
The voice transcript further substantiates this conclusion. It would 
appear that the UHT's hung up in the front tool bracket and following this 
the LMP told the CDR to 11pull that pin there, 11 indicating that all the pins 
had not been removed prior to attempting to unstow the UHT's, contrary to 
the sequence of events specified by the deployment procedure. 
During training exercises, with the E-2A-2 Crew Training Model, and 
during the CF2 (Crew Fit and Function) Test, with the flight hardware, there 
was no evidence of the problem encountered on the moon, -due to tolerance 
buildup, etc., so long as the crew adhered to the remove four pins and then 
u~stow UHT's sequence. 
33 
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In tests conducted with the E-2A-2 Crew Training hardware of MSC and 
at BxA it was not possible to duplicate the UHT /front tool bracket hang up 
with all four pins removed. 
Figure # 1 illustrates that pin# 1 must always 
and hence we may speak of a pin# 1/2 combination. 
pulling permutations, as follows: 
(a) (1,2),3,4 
(b) 3, 4, (1, 2) 
(c) 4, (1, 2), 3 
(d) (1, 2), 4, 3 
(e) 3, (1, 2), 4 
(f) 4, 3, (1, 2). 
be removed prior to pin #2 
This produces 3 factorial pin 
If we accept that one pin was not removed prior to attempting to remove 
the UHT's, as indicated ~ythe voice transcript, the following analysis results. 
Sequences (c) and (d), wherein pin #3 which secures the UHT 1 s to the front 
tool bracke~ is not removed, ,would have produced the following sort of problem 
which has been demonstrated by testing. On;. trying to extract the UHT 1 s, the 
front tool bracket would have come free of Subpackage #2 and tended to pull 
the DRT forward until it caught on the center tool bracket. These sequences 
would explain how the DRT might have wedged on the center subpallet bracketry 
and the front bracket might have wedged on the DRT, which might have caused 
problems with the DRT, but these sequences would not have caused the UHT 1 s 
to hang up in the front tool bracket after the pin had been removed and the DRT 
does not appear to have been hungup! 
Sequences (a) and (e), wherein pin #4 which secures the DRT to the front 
tool bracket is not removed, also might have caused the DR T to catch on the 
center tool bracket .ii_ the UHT 1 s were already hung up in the front tool bracket, 
but does not explain how the UHT 1 s got hung up in the first place and, as is 
the case with sequences (c) and (d), there was no evidence of the DRT having 
been hung up. In fact tests and extensive deployment experience with this hardware 
indicates that leaving pin #4 in place while removing the UHT 1 s is at least as 
good a sequence as removing all the pin~ prior to removing the UHT 1s. 
"u. 
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The one sequence of events that testing has indicated could cause some 
hang up of the UHT's in the front tool bracket, as opposed to a hang up of the 
bracket itself, the DRT, the FTT or the carry bars (all of which are possible 
but are not indicated by the evidence), is that the UHT's must have been 
removed prior to releasing the front tool bracket. Sequences (b) and (f) 
thus seem to provide the best explanation of the Apollo 15 anomaly in that 
they do not require that the DR T or some other component be hung up. It 
appears from the tests that if the front tool bracket is not free to "float", 
the UHT removal can be a bit rough. 
Therefore, from all the available evidence, it would appear that the 
CDR removed the DR T, UHT and subpallet pull pins, but not the tool bracket 
pin, and then attempted to remove the UHT 1 s and experienced a hang up of 
the UHT's in the front tool bracket. This was the result of a procedural 
error. The tool bracket should be released before unstowing the UHT's. The 
degree of difficulty experienced could not be duplicated in testing, nor can it 
be explained based on the available evidence. Whether pin pulling sequence 
(b) or (f) was employed cannot be stated with any certainty. 
e. Plans for Additional Testing, Etc. 
No additional testing of this tool stowage configuration is planned. Arrays 
D and E each incorporates a different tool stowage approach from that used on 
Apollo 15. Presently planned mechanical and Crew Engineering tests, crew 
experience with training hardware and CF2 testing, along with adherence to 
established deployment procedures, should prevent a recurrence of this 
anomaly. Crew Engineering will recommend to the flight crews (who have the 
decision authority) that numerical decals be used in conjunction with pull pins 
that must or should be pulled in a specified sequence. 
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2. Shorting Switch Activation 
a. Apollo 15 Final Lunar Surface Procedures 
11 LMP Activities 
Report shorting switch reading 
Connect R TG cable to C/S 
Depress shorting switch 
Check shorting switch amps zero 
Turn Astro Switch #1 clockwise 
Request X-rnitter turn on 
EVA Time 
4 hr, 23 min 
4 hr, 23 min 
5 hr, 25 min 
5 hr, 25 min 
5 hr, 26 min 
5 hr, 26 min'" 
b. Apollo 15 Technical Air-to-Ground Voice Transcription 
11 Day Hr Min Sec 
05 
05 
05 
05 
05 
05 
05 
05 
05 
05 
05 
04 30 
04 31 
05 12 
05 13 
05 13 
05 13 
05 13 
05 15 
05 33 
05 33 
05 33 
37 
23 
49 
00 
14 
21 
40 
34 
29 
33 
42 
LMP-EVA 
LMP-EVA 
cc 
LMP-EVA 
cc 
LMP-EVA 
LMP-EVA 
cc 
LMP-EVA 
cc 
LMP-EVA 
Okay, Joe. On the shorting switch, I'm 
reading about . 8. 
Okay. R TG cable is connected. 
Roger, Jim. We think a shorting switch 
may have been inadvertently depressed. 
Could you take a look at that for us, please? 
Sure will, wish I could blow on it. 
It won't work. I'll guarantee it. 
All right. I just pulled the pin. 
It might have been inadvertently depressed, 
Joe. Check it now. 
Roger, Jim. While you're working there, 
it looks like that switch is still depressed 
It doesn't really make any difference to us, 
but when it comes time to align the antenna 
you will have to be careful not to point the 
antenna at any of the experiment cables. Over. 
Okay, Joe. I'm going to depress the shorting 
switch, even though you say it probably is. 
Roger. That's good, Jim. Depress the shortin1 
switch and turn ASTRO switch number 1 clock-
wise. 
Okay. It's depressed. Turning number-switch 
number I clockwise. Okay, It's full clockwise, 
Joe. Why don't you try a transmitter turn on?" 
NO. REV. NO. 
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c. Apollo 15 ALSEP A-2 Astronaut Debriefing 
"(Q) The transcript is unclear as to whether you actually pulled the 
R TG shorting plug lanyard. Did you? 
'(A) A clear cut answer was not obtained. After much discussion 
he said he 'thinks he did. 1 The PCU did not switch from side 
# 1 to side #2. - (Jim Irwin- LMP) 11 
d. Analysis and Completed Tests (See Figure 3) 
The deployment procedure indicates that the LMP should report the 
ammeter reading on the shorting plug (which should be greater than zero), 
then mate the shorting plug to Central Station, and subsequently he should 
depress the shorting switch and visually check the ammeter to ensure that it 
is now reading zero. He would next turn on Astro Switch# 1 and the trans-
mitter would then be turned on. 
The voice transcript indicates that the ammeter did read greater than 
zero prior to plug in. The reading of. 8 was higher than the predicted value 
of. 56, indicating that the RTG was putting out more current than expected. 
Since the transmitter automatically turns on at approximately 55-60 watts 
(as long as the shorting switch has been depressed) and we know that there 
was acquisition of signal at approximately 5 hrs., 02 min. (18:37 G. M. T. ), 
31 minutes after plug in (18:06 G. M. T. ), we can assume the shorting switch 
was depressed during plug ~twas not depressed prior to plug in since the 
. 8 a~et~UPtJ.ea.dtag-tmi't'cmed that the short was still in just prior to mating. 
The inadvertent depression of the shorting switch during plug in was 
shown to have occurred on Apollo 12 as well. As a result of the Apollo 12 
experience a lanyard and pull ring were added to the shorting plug to per-
mit the astronaut to reset the shorting switch and return the shorting plug to 
the shorted condition. 
At 5 hrs., 12 min., and 49 sec. into EVA 1, when the capsule communi-
cator notified the crew that the shorting switch might have been inadvertently 
depressed, the LMP indicated that he could not see the ammeter due to dust 
coverage when he said "wish I could blow on it. 11 The LMP indicated that he 
33 
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pulled the pull ring/lanyard to reset the shorting switch when he said that 
"I just f.ulled the pin" and later at the debriefing he restated that he thought 
he pulled the push button out. However tliere was no loss of signal or 
switching frotn PCU 1 to PCU 2, both of which events would have occurred 
if he had pulled the lanyard, reset the switch and reshorted the shorting 
plug. 
Could there have been a failure? During the running of the RTG 
Leak and Resistance check _on the Apollo 15 flight hardware, at KSC prior 
to the flight, it was noted that the Apollo 15 shorting plug was not shorting 
when the reset push button was pulled out. In working out the DR it was 
found that a- short could not be achieved when the switch was pulled slowly 
or when the lanyard was pulled out of line with the direction of button travel, 
but that it could be achieved if the lanyard/switch were jerked and the pull 
direction was in line with button travel. 
A comparison was made with the Apollo 16 shorting plug and the 
necessity to pull the switch rapidly and in line with button travel was not in 
evidence. It was also noted that the reset action of the Apollo 16 push 
button was smoother and the extent of the upward travel of the button was 
greater. It appeared that a mechanical interferenc~ problem with the snap 
ring precluded full vertical travel of the button and, hence, reseting of the 
micro switch which controls the shorting function to occu:r:-. To eliminate 
the problem the snap ring thickness was reduced approximately 0. 011 inch. 
Retesting indicated that the problem had been eliminated; the extra travel 
ensured positive switch operation. The Apollo 15 flight crew also verified 
this switch reset capability during the Delta CF2. 
There is general agreement that the shorting switch was inadvertently 
depressed during shorting plug mating to Central Station. The voice tran-
script indicates that the LMP pulled the push button out to reinstate the 
short, but the fact that there was no switching from PCU 1 to PCU 2 as a 
result of loss of signal indicates that the push button was not pulled out or 
t~t there was a switching failure. Su::h a switch failure occurred in testing, 
was fixed, and did not reoccur during retesting. Why the lanyard actuation, 
assuming it occurred, had no effect is =!!tUl unexplained. 
e. : Plans for Additional Testing, Etc. 
The R TG Leak and Resistance Check and CF2 Test of the Array D 
shorting switch reset should reconfirm that there is no shorting problem 
with the Apollo 16 hardware. Furthermore, the procedures for Apollo 16 
;'~ ; .. 
.:-;., 
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are to be modified so that if the switch is inadvertently activated prior to 
plug in (i.e., if the ammeter reading is zero), the astronaut would pull the 
lanyard, read the ammeter again, and plug the shorting plug in whether 
the reading was zero (short removed) or greater than zero (plug is 
shorted). A "hot" plug in is permissible under these circumstances. 
If, after plug in, -he reads the ammeter (this is a new step in the proce-
dure) and the ammeter reads zero or if there is acquisition of a signal, 
both of which indicate that the switch has been depressed, there will be no 
attempt to reset the switch (this is also a change to the A-2, Apollo 15 
procedure). 
For Array E (Apollo 17) the shorting plug has been redesigned, in 
part to eliminate the inadvertent switch activation problem.·, The push 
button has been replaced by a rotery switch that is far less prone to inadver-
tent activation. A full test program will ensure proper functioning of the 
shorting plug. 
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PAGE 15 
DATE 10-11-71 ·' 
3. UHT /SIDE Interface 
a. Apollo 15 Final Lunar Surface Procedures 
"LMP Activities 
Lift SIDE from subpallet 
Remove B. Bolt blocking cable reel 
Unstow cable reel 
Deploy SIDE legs and place SIDE on surface 
Retrieve SIDE near subpallet 
Carry SIDE 55 ft NE, deploying cable 
Select SIDE deploy site 
Remove SIDE dust cover 
Remove and emplace ground screen 
Remove CCIG cover 
Remove CCIG from cavity 
Mount CCIG in ground screen tube 
Place SIDE on ground screen 
Level and align SIDE 
b. Apollo 15 Technical Air- To-Ground Voice Transcription 
No indication of a problem. 
c. Apollo 15 ALSEP A-2 Astronaut Debriefing 
EVA Time 
4 hrs, 27 min 
4 hrs, 28 min 
4 hrs, 28 min 
4 hrs, 29 min 
5 hrs, 15 min 
5 hrs, 15 min 
5 hrs, 17 min 
5 hrs, 17 min 
5 hrs, 18 inin 
5 hrs, 19 min 
5 hrs, 19 min 
5 hrs, 20 min 
5 hrs, 21 min 
5 hrs, 21 min" 
"(Q) Is there anything in addition to the above you would like to bring 
up in relation to the ALSEP? 
(A) Could not obtain positive engagement of UHT in SIDE handling 
socket. SIDE was dropped several times. (NOTE: Most 
probable cause was dirt in socket from UHT and/or alignment 
of UHT with socket.) (Jim Irwin- LMP)" 
d. Analysis and Completed Tests 
', A test, at MSC, w4:th the E-2A-2 Crew Training Model hardware after 
the flight (see Figure #4) could not duplicate the engagement difficulty or the 
problem of inadvertent disengagement. A CF2 test of the flight hardware prior 
to the flight indicated that there was no problem associated with the fit checks 
::~ 
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of both UHT's to the SIDE carry socket. There was no problem during the 
flight with any carry socket other than the one on SIDE. 
If dirt had gotten on the UHT this could have caused problems with 
.UHT engagement, but should not haveled to inadvertent disengagement prob-
lems. The lack of a problem with engagement of the UHT elsewhere on 
ALSEP supports the unlikeliness of dirt having been the source of the 
problem. 
The lack of a problem elsewhere on ALSEP also tends to argue against 
the UHT having been at fault. A tolerance problem on the SIDE UHT socket 
that would h.a.ve caloJ!Jedproblems on engaging the tool would have tended to prevent 
inadvertent tliseng!gement. Likewise a UHT socket tolerance problem that 
would have tended to facilitate inadvertent disengagement would not have caused 
problems on engagement. 
The comparatively high location of the SIDE carry socket which makes 
UHT engagement somewhat awkward could be one source of the engagement 
problem. Any attempt to engage the UHT after the legs are deployed and 
the experiment is tilted 26 o becomes a difficult problem of judgment and 
of maintaining experiment stability. Engaging a UHT into an angled UHT 
socket has been shown, in testing, to be difficult; especially at 1/6 G when 
the act of engaging the tool tends to move the experiment away from the 
crewman. 
As a result, of all of the above problems, it is most likely, also based 
on testing, that the UHT "balls" were not fully engaged and that the SIDE fell off 
the UHT because of incomplete UHT engagement. Also experience in testing 
has shown that the crewman can inadvertently depress the UHT trigger, 
release the "balls" on the UHT and drop the experiment. 
e. Plans for Additional Testing, Etc. 
Since the SIDE will not fly again on ALSEP there will be no further 
testing of the UHT/SIDE interface. However, training experience plus CF 2 
fit checks of all UHT/UHT socket interfaces should tend to prevent a re-
occurrence of this problem on Apollo 16 and 17 hardware. In addition it has 
been recommended that dimensional checks of all Array D and E trainer 
and flight UHT's and UHT sockets be performed prior to shipment and that 
all qual and flight UHT sockets be tested with qual and flight UHT' s to ensure 
that there is no UHT disengagement when a force equal to twice the weight 
of the component being tested is applied to the handle of the UHT. 
33 
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4. HFE Boyd Bolts 
a. Apollo 15 Final Lunar Surface Procedures 
"CDR Activities 
Release probe box B. Bolts (4) 
Lift probe box from pallet 
Separate box and lean probe with tool against pallet 
Carry other probe to drill site, deploying cable 
Place probe on surface 
Carry 1st probe to drill site, deploying cable 
Place probe on surface 
Release electronics box B. Bolts (4) 
Lift electronics box from pallet 
Remove dust cover 
Kick pallet clear of area 
Place box on surface, level and align 
EVA Time 
4 hrs, 28 min 
4 hrs, 29 min 
4 hrs, 30 min 
4 hrs, 31 min 
4 hrs, 32 min 
4 hrs, 32 min 
4 hrs, 33 min 
4 hrs, 34 min 
4 hrs, 35 min 
4 hrs, 35 min 
4 hrs, 36 min 
4 hrs, 3 6 min" 
b. Apollo 15 Technical Air- To-Ground Voice Transcription 
"Day Hr Min Sec 
05 04 38 45 CDR-EVA I've got a Boyd bolt problem. 
05 04 39 07 CDR-EVA Gummit. 
05 04 39 21 CDR-EVA Stuck Boyd bolt, Joe. Never get 
those things apart without that 
though. 
05 04 40 22 CDR-EVA There we go. 
05 04 40 24 cc Beautiful. 
05 04 41 00 cc Dave, did the bolt come free ? 
05 04 41 05 CDR-EVA Yes, I got it. 
05 04 46 19 CDR-EVA Well, my gosh. Things just aren't 
working too good. There. 
05 04 47 10 CDR-EVA Hey, Joe. The heat flow is leveled, 
and the shadow is-right between 2 and 
3 on the index. 11 
c. Apollo 15 ALSEP A-2 Astronaut Debriefing 
"(Q) The problem you encountered with the HFE subpackage--was 
it stability of the subpallet,dirt/dust? --Please describe. 
MO. REV. M' 
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(A) Had difficulty in releasing two Boyd bolts. One on probe box 
and one on electronics; both on right rear. Would not release 
with 70° rotation., Tried several times at larger angles. 
Eventually they came free. No problem with other bolts. 
(Dave Scott - CDR) 
(Q) Was there any problems with Boyd bolts which were not stated? 
Any problem with dust/dirt on bolts? 
(A) No problem. All worked. (Jim Irwin-LMP)" 
d. Analysis and Completed Tests 
The voice transcript and crew debriefing indicated that the CDR had 
difficulty releasing two Boyd bolts, one on the HFE Electronics Package and 
one on the HFE Probe Package. Similar difficulties have been encountered 
in the past during testing, crew training and on the lunar surface. Most of 
the earlier difficulties with Boyd bolt release were traced to improper 
installation and as a result improved procedures, installation tools, and 
increased testing and monitoring precautions were instituted tq ensure as 
nearly perfect a record of Boyd bolt installation as possible. • 
It is still more likely, that the vibration of launch or lunar descent 
might have caused a binding in the Boyd bolt fasteners that led to the difficulty 
experienced by the crew. Such a "sticking" of Boyd bolts has been encountered 
in past testing and, as a re-sult, the contingency procedures for Apollo 15 were 
modified to recommend that if a Boyd bolt spindle would not freely depress 
that the crewman should attempt to rotate the UHT several degrees clockwise 
and then continue with the standard Boyd bolt release sequence. This con-
tingency procedure has been found to be highly effective. Other contingency 
procedures for other potential malfunction modes, plus the fact that the 
two Boyd bolts did release after some extra effort by the crew, indicate that 
the present Boyd bolt design, installation and testing is adequate. 
Another potential problem area is that of dirt getting into the guide cup 
on the electronics package or the tube on the probe package (see Figure #5). 
Dust covers over the Boyd bolt cups throughout ALSF;:P as well as dust covers 
over the probe package tubes (not shown in Figure #5~ prevent the entry of 
dust kicked up by the crew. In addition separate dust covers protect 
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the experiments, though they do not cover and protect the Boyd bolts. Diffi-
culty in releasing a Boyd bolt on the Apollo 14 SIDE led to the provision of 
additional dust protection where dirt might possibly pile up on top of a guide 
cup dust cover and be driven into the guide cup by the UHT. Whenever 
possible, so long as the crew brushes off any dirt that might have accumu-
lated on top of a dust cover prior to puncturing the dust cover with the UHT, 
the present dust protection measures should eliminate debris as a source 
of difficulty in releasing Boyd bolts. The voice transcript and crew 
debriefing, plus the presence of dust covers, do not support a dirt-induced 
Boyd bolt problem hypothesis, especially since six of the eight HF E Boyd 
bolts were released without any difficulty. 
A test performed at MSC with the E-2A-2 Crew Training hardware 
after the flight (see Figure #4) and the CF2 Test with the flight hardware 
prior to the flight did not turn up any difficulty similar to that experienced 
by the CDR on the lunar surface. 
e. Plans for Additional Testing, Etc. 
Other than the presently established procedures and testing for all 
Array D and E Boyd bolts, no additional testing, etc. is planned. Additional 
efforts to fax:nilarize the flight crews with Boyd bolt contingency procedures 
is recommended for Apollo 16 and \7 • 
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5. 8IDE Connector 
a. Apollo 15 Final Lunar Surface Procedures 
11 LMP Activities 
Unstow SIDE cable connector 
Open Expts Pkg dust cover 
Connect SIDE cable to C/S 
EVA Time 
4 hrs, 30 min 
4 hrs, 30 min 
4 hrs, 31 min" 
b. Apollo 15 Technical Air-To-Ground Voice Transcription 
"Day Hr Min 
05 
05 
05 
05 
05 
05 
05 
05 
05 
05 
05 
05 
05 
05 
05 
04 
04 
04 
04 
04 
37 
38 
38 
38 
39 
04 40 
04 41 
04 41 
04 41 
04 41 
04 41 
04 42 
04 42 
04 42 
04 42 
25 
37 
43 
52 
53 
56 
00 
14 
49 
55 
Sec 
50 
01 
43 
45 
21 
LMP- EVA Okay. And I'm moving over to connect 
the SIDE cable to the Central Station. 
CC Very fine. 
LMP- EVA Got any more slack in that cable, Dave? 
CDR-EVA Yes, I'll put some more in it. 
CDR-EVA Down, down. 
LMP-EVA 
cc 
LMP-EVA 
cc 
CDR-EVA 
LMP-EVA 
cc 
Hook on SIDE cable not locking down 
very well. 
Jim, have you gotten that connection yet? 
Not very positive, I'm afraid, Joe~ · Try 
it again. 
Say ag_ain, please. 
Pull it off. 
That pulls right off. I ought to work on 
it. 
LMP-EVA 
LMP-EVA 
cc 
Jim, just make sure that the ears are 
pulled back before you plug it in. 
Back. 
Ah, I got it, Joe. Got it; Ooh. 
Outstanding. 11 
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c. Apollo 15 A -2 Astronaut Debriefing 
"(Q) Was the SIDE connector problem as advertised; i.e., was collar 
in the wrong position? 
(A) No. Required excessive force to connect. Had to use all of his 
weight. He stated he had some problem during CF2 at KSC. 
(Jim Irwin-LMP)" 
d. Analysis and Completed Tests (See Figure 6) 
The voice transcript and crew debriefing indicate that the LMP had to 
use excessive force to mate the SIDE connector to the Central Station. He 
also had some difficulty with this connector during the CF2 Test. Difficulty 
in mating the SIDE and R TG connectors (both of which are of the Deutsch 
type) has been experienced previously during various tests, in training and 
on the lunar surface. The Microdot connectors (used on the HFE and the 
LEAM experiments) have proved to require similar mating forces although 
no difficulty was experienced mating the HFE connector on the moon. Since 
dust covers on the experiment and Central Station connectors eliminate dirt 
from being a problem, the consensus is that the excessive force can be attributed 
to tolerance build-up. 
Tests were performed at BxA using Crew Engineering test hardware. 
The tests indicated 15 to 17 pounds force (15. 6 pounds mean) was required 
to mate the RTG (Deutsch type) connector and 18 to 20 pounds force (19. 2 
pounds mean) was required to mate the HF E (Microdot type) connector. 
No tests were performed on the SIDE (Deutsch type) connector because of 
the unavailability of suitable hardware for the test. However, it can be 
fairly stated that the engagement force to be expected from the SIDE con-
nector (37 pins) will tend to be higher than that measured on the RTG con-
nector (27 pins) since engagement force tends to increase with a higher 
number of pins. 
Finally, the shape of the SIDE connector handle (tubular) and the 
orientation of the handle (in line with the direction of push-to-mate) make 
the engagement task somewhat difficult. 
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e. Plans for Additional Testing, Etc. 
No additional testing of the SIDE connector is planned since the SIDE 
will not be flown again on the remaining Apollo flights. However, there are 
plans to test the RTG and HFE connectors to be flown on Apollo 16 and 17, 
and the LEAM connector to be flown on Apollo 17, with the tests to be per-
formed on both th.e training and flight models in order to detect any tolerance 
build-up problems prior to CF2 Testing and flight. 
In addition the type of handle that was used on the SIDE connector will 
not be used on future flights. "U"-shaped handles, which have proven to be 
a suitable interface for grasping during connector mating will continue to be 
used on the HFE, as well as on the LEAM. The two "ears" that are grasped 
with both hands in order to mate the R TG connector, that have caused 
some difficulty in the past, are being replaced with a "T" handle on Array E 
ALSEP, which should provide better, one-handed control for RTG connector 
mating. Finally, all the connectors used on Apollo 17 and 16, with the 
exception of the old style RTG connector used on Apollo 16, will have secon-
dary rotational locking features, in addition to the push to engage feature, 
to ensure against accidental disengagement of the connectors. 
"U• " .... ., .. 
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6. Rear Curtain Cover Lanyard 
a. Apollo 15 Final Lunar Surface Procedures 
"LMP Activities 
Starting front center and proceeding CW, release/ 
deploy in turn B. Bolts, SIDE cable, antenna cable 
and rear curtain cover 
EVA Time 
5 hrs, 00 min" 
b. Apollo 15 Technical Air-To-Ground Voice Transcription 
Day Hr Min Sec 
05 05 10 22 
05 05 10 43 
05 05 10 50 
05 05 10 51 
05 05 10 52 
05 05 10 57 
OS 05 11 00 
OS 05 11 02 
05 05 11 04 
05 05 11 OS 
OS 05 11 18 
05 05 11 31 
05 05 11 39 
LMP-EVA 
cc 
LMP-EVA 
cc 
LMP-EVA 
LMP-EVA 
CDR-EVA 
LMP-EVA 
CDR-EVA 
LMP-EVA 
CDR-EVA 
LMP-EVA 
CDR-EVA 
Got a malfunction over here on the sun-
shield, Houston. The cord broke, on those 
pins that have to come out to release the 
aft sunshield. 
Okay, Jim. We copy that. Is that on the 
LSM? 
Oh, no. It's on the Central Station. 
Oh. Roger. 
I guess I'll have to get down on my hands 
and knees to get those too. 
Dave, I'll have to get dirty and get down. 
Can I help you? 
You might have to help me to get back up. 
Joe, my ... is clear. 
Sure wished I had a UHT. 
Oh, I made it. 
Careful. 
c. Apollo 15 ALSEP A-2 Astrpnaut Debriefing 
''(Q) How did the cord/lanyard break on PDM cover /rear curtain? 
(A) Lan)B.rd broke at two points. The first break occurred between 
the rear curtain cover lanyard handling socket and the first pin. 
Irwin thought the break occurred at the pin. The second break 
occurred someplace between the two pins when an attempt was 
made to pull the pins by using the UHT to pull the lanyard con-
necting the two pins. The pins were finally removed by hand. 
Irwin said he got down on his knees so he could pull the pins. 
(Jim Irwin- LMP)" 
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d. Analysis and Completed Tests 
Figure #7 illustrates the stowed configuration of the Array A-2 rear 
thermal curtain cover and its associated UHT socket, lanyard and pins. 
The breaking of the lanyard during Apollo 15, which occurred between the 
UHT socket and the first pin and between the two pins, had not been pre-
viously experienced during testing, training or the CF2 Test of the flight 
equipment. The 50 pound test tufbraid lanyard used as the rear curtain 
cover lanyard was used throughout ALSEP for what were generally non-pip 
pin interfaces and the lanyard knots were generally proof tested to 20 pounds. 
For pip pin interfaces the use of 180 pound test lanyard was the norm and 
the knots involved were proof tested to 40 pounds. Up to Apollo 15 these 
measures appeared to be adequate. 
After the lanyard failure on Apollo 15, a test was performed at MSC 
using the E-2A-2 Crew Training Model (see Figures 8 through lO)in an attempt 
to duplicate the Apollo 15 experience. The nominal and contingency deploy-
ment modes were repeated but there was no failure experienced. This test, 
which was run at ambient temperatures, was consistent with a calculated 
temperature of 74 oF for the rear curtain cover at the time it failed. (Empirical 
data from thermistors on the flight hardware indicated a temperature for the 
curtain cover in the neighborhood of 62 oF, based on a reading from ather-
mistor located on a proximate Central Station surface.) 
Tests on lanyard break strength, using both 50 and 180 pound lanyards, 
were conducted at both ambient and elevated temperatures, using both 
steady and jerking type pulls, in line with and at angles to the nominal pin 
removal axis. The "bowline" knot, the knot most generally used on ALSEP, 
and the 11 slip"knot, and four and eight inch lengths of lanyard were tested. 
The results are summarized below: 
50 pound test lanyard 
180 pound test lanyard 
Steady Pull 
20-3 5 pounds 
75-100 pounds 
Jerking Pull 
22-34 pounds 
45-108 pounds 
Almost all the breaks (about 95%) occurred within the knot assembly, pre-
""!· sumably because of stress concentrations within the knots. This would 
explain the breaking strength being less than the rated strength of the lanyards. 
The 40 pound proof testing (done in conjunction with the 180 pound test lan-
yards and pip pins) would consistently have failed the 50 pound test lanyards, 
based on these tests. Other results include the fact that "slip" knots were 
not as strong as "bowline" knots. Also none of the knots became untied, 
·,.;; 
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Figure ·7 Top and Side Views of Rear Curtain Cover, 
Lanyard, Pins and UHT Socket 
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Figure # 8 
Rear Curtain Cover Test: 
UHT Engagement and Removal of First Pin 
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Rear Curtain Cover Test: 
Removal of Second Pin and Removal of Curtain Cover 
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Figure #10 
Rear Curtain Cover Test: 
Manual Removal of Curtain Cover Pins 
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nor was there a tendency of the braid to unravel. Temperature and 
lanyard length were not significant variables. However, a jerking pull 
(at least for the 180 pound test lanyard) appears to slightly decrease the 
levels at which a lanyard will break. (It is believed that instrumentation 
errors tended to increase the break force level that was recorded and that 
a jerking pull generally tends to break the lanyards at lower fore e levels 
than those recorded.) The velocity of pull, angle of pull, and the amount 
of slack or tautness in the lanyard all seemed to be of some significance. 
In suminary, s·tress concentrations, as when the UHT handle was in contact 
with the lanyard or where the lanyard contacts the UHT socket or a pin, 
appear to act on the knots (and the lanyard its elf) so as to tend to lead toward 
lanyard breakage. A jerking pull tends to increase the tendency toward 
breakage as does the type of knot employed. And finally, if the direction 
of pull is not in line with the pin removal axis, there will be binding of the 
pin and a greater chance of the lanyard breaking. 
Another, KC-135 test of the Array E carry bar, conducted after the 
Apollo 15 flight, strongly indicated that 50 pound test lanyards {which were 
used in the contingency mode of carry bar release from the subpackages) 
were very prone to breakage when they were jerked off angle from the axis 
of pin release. The knots, at the interface to the pins were, again, the 
breaking point for two separate lanyards during this test. 
e. Plans for Additional Testing, Etc. 
Based on the Apollo 15 experience, analyses and the tests that were 
already performed, the 50 pound test lanyard used on the rear curtain cover 
has been replaced by a 180 pound test lanyard on Array D. There is no 
lanyard in the Array E curtain cover design; hence no replacement was 
required. The 50 pound test lanyards used for the contingency removal of 
pins on the Array E carry bar design {no lanyards are present on,,the Array 
D design) have been replaced with 180 pound test lanyards. 
l-
Engineering is now analyzing th3 lanyard usage on 
Arrays D and E. Whenever possible on all new lanyard call-outs, particularly on 
Array E, the preferred lanyard call-out has become 180 pound test tufbraid. As 
additiOXJ.a.Ldrawing and operational reviews continue additional upgrading of ·lanyards 
from 50 to 180 pound test tufbraid is being considered and lanyard contact · 
areas a~rte being reviewed. One exception, the K-23 nylon thread {2-3 pounds 
break force~used to retain the HFE emplacement tool within its sleeve 
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and to prevent premature extension of the tool, will purposely not be upgraded 
since this thread is intentionally supposed, to break with a minimum pull force. 
In addition, engineering is requesting a ""t.Ianufacturing Procedure MP be generated 
for drawing and procedural call-outs for the tieing of lanyard bowline knots, 
heat treatment of the knots, and new criteria for visual inspection of lanyards and 
their knots, including proof test requirements, etc. Present procedures for 
cauterizing lanyard ends to prevent unraveling and the application of EPON 901 
adhesive to knots to prevent their being untied are adequate. 
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